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ABSTRACT
An automated auction is an efficient market institution for real-
world trading of commodities. This paper presents a novel fuzzy
bidding strategy(FAA-Bid), which employs assessments of multi-
ple attributes of items as well as agents’ attitude on bidding item to
procure an item in automated auction. The assessment of attributes
adapts the fuzzy sets technique to handle uncertainty of the bidding
process as well use heuristic rules to determine attitude of bidding
agents in simulated auctions to procure goods. The overall assess-
ment is used to determine a price range based on current bid, which
finally selects the best one as the new bid.
1. INTRODUCTION
In electronic market places, auctions are widely recognised as
efficient mechanisms to allocate goods and resources to the entities
that value them most highly. Intelligent software agents [1,3,9,10]
provide a powerful tool to address complex problems of dynamic
pricing in automated auctions. The agents can use different auction
mechanisms (e.g. English, Dutch, Vickery etc.) for procurement
of goods or reaching agreement between agents. The agent makes
decisions on behalf of consumer and endeavours to guarantee the
delivery of item according to the buyer’s preferences. In these auc-
tions buyers are faced with difficult task of deciding amount to bid
in order to get the desired item matching their preferences. For
this reason, the formalisation of bidding mechanism has received
a great deal of attention from the agent community for the past
decade. These software agents should be smart enough to bargain
a favourable deal for the user. In order to be called an intelligent
agent, the software must satisfy several criteria like autonomy, tem-
poral continuity, communication and cooperation. To this end, a
number of researchers [14, 15, 17, 19, 21] have reported different
frameworks that help an autonomous agent to tackle the problem of
bidding in auctions. Currently, no single implementation satisfies
all the criteria, but there are several promising results for bargaining
intelligent agents.
In this paper, a fuzzy bidding strategy (FAA-Bid) is designed in
an automated auction based on the dual assessment of multiple at-
tributes of items as well as agents’s attitude on bidding item. To
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quantify attitudes and to deal with uncertainty of attribute assess-
ment fuzzy sets technique is applied in the presented strategy. The
basic procedure of the strategy is shown in Figure 1. The remainder
of the paper is organized as below. First, the detail of the presented
strategy is illustrated. Then, a simple experiment is conducted. Re-









Figure 1: A Fuzzy Bidding Strategy (FAA-Bid) Model.
2. RELATED WORKS
There have been several approaches from computer scientists
for developing intelligent software methods and protocols for au-
tomated negotiation. In particular, the first trading agent compe-
tition (TAC) was held in Boston in July 2000 [12]. TAC agents
acted as simulated travel agents and had to procure goods for their
clients in different types of auctions, bidding against autonomous
agents. Priest et al. [20] proposed an algorithm design for agents
that participate in multiple simultaneous English auctions. The
algorithm proposes a coordination mechanism to be used in en-
vironment where all the auctions terminate simultaneously, and a
learning method to tackle auctions that terminate at different times.
Byde et al. [3] presented another decision theoretic framework that
an autonomous agent can use to bid effectively across multiple auc-
tions with various protocols. The framework uses an approximation
function that provides an estimate of the expected utility of par-
ticipating in the set of future auctions and it can be employed to
purchase single or multiple items. Anthony et al. [1] proposed an
approach for agents to bid for a single item in English, Dutch, and
Vickrey auctions. The agent decides what to bid based on four pa-
rameters: i) the remaining time; ii) the number of remaining auc-
tions; iii) the desire for bargain; and iv) the desperateness of the
agent. The overall strategy is to combine these four tactics using
a set of relative weights provided by the user. In an extension to
this model [19], a genetic algorithm is used to search the effective
strategies so that an agent can behave appropriately according to its
assessment of its prevailing circumstances. The machine learning
techniques [21] are also used to obtain a model of the price dynam-
ics based on the past data (e.g., the data in the seeding round) to
predict the closing prices of the hotels in the future. It also uses
mixed-integer linear programming to find the optimal allocation of
the goods.
Considering the existed uncertainty in auctions, the fuzzy tech-
niques are used to manage an agent’s interactions. Faratin et al. [7]
used fuzzy similarity to compute trade offs among multiple at-
tributes during bilateral negotiations in order to find a win-win so-
lution for both parties. Kowalcyzk and Bui [13, 14] modeled the
multi-issue negotiation process as a fuzzy constraint satisfaction
problem. Their approach performs negotiation on individual solu-
tions one at a time. During negotiation, an agent evaluates the of-
fers, relaxes the preferences, constraints and makes counter-offers
to find an agreement for both parties. Luo et al. [15, 16] developed
a fuzzy constraint based framework for bilateral multi-issue nego-
tiations in semi-competitive trading environments. The framework
is expressed via two knowledge models, one for the seller agent
and one for the buyer agent. The seller agent’s domain knowl-
edge consists of its multi-dimensional representation of products
or services it offers. The buyer agent’s domain knowledge consists
of the buyer’s requirement/preference model (a prioritized fuzzy
constraint problem) and buyer’s profile model (fuzzy truth propo-
sitions).The buyer and seller agents exchange offers and counter-
offers with additional constraints revealed or existing constraints
being relaxed. Finally, a solution is found if there is one.He et
al. [10] proposed the fuzzy logic strategy, which was the first time
that fuzzy sets and fuzzy reasoning were introduced into the heuris-
tic rules for agents. A fuzzy logic seller or buyer calculates an ask
or a bid by considering the relationship among the outstanding bid,
the outstanding ask, and the reference price which was the median
of the ordered price history. It uses fuzzy reasoning techniques to
predict closing price of auctions, fuzzy recognition to assess the de-
gree of competitiveness in the prevailing market context, anf fuzzy
set technique to control bidding behavior. Ma and Leung [17] de-
veloped and evaluated the adaptive attitude strategy that exploits
both the short term and long term attitudes, and utilizes a set of
heuristic rules in bid determination.
Different researchers have also provided alternatives to fuzzy
reasoning for coping with the uncertainties in bidding. For ex-
ample, the possibility-based approach [18] has been used to per-
form multi-agent reasoning under uncertainty for bilateral nego-
tiations where uncertainties due to the lack of knowledge about
other agents’ behaviors are modeled by possibility distributions.
The Bayesian learning method has also been used to model multi-
issue negotiation in a sequential decision making model. In [26], a
Bayesian network is used to update the knowledge and belief each
agent has about the environment and other agents, and offers and
counter-offers between agents during bilateral negotiations are gen-
erated based on Bayesian probabilities.
3. A FUZZY BIDDING STRATEGY (FAA-
BID)
3.1 Basic Scenario
In this section, we will present an automated bidding strategy
using fuzzy sets and attitudes. Our strategy is discussed based on
the following scenario.
1) Suppose a travel agent wants to book tickets for some clients.
These clients have different preference and requirements on the
possible tickets. Assume that six factors are concerned in this situ-
ation, i.e. ticket price (c0, e.g. from $800 – $2000), depart time (c1,
e.g. 18:00 PM, Wednesday), arrival time (c2, e.g. 10:00 AM, Fri-
day), number of stops (c3, e.g. at most 3 stops), seat positions (c4,
e.g. near Window, Aisle, etc), and travel season (c5, e.g. off-peak
season).
2) Suppose the identified perspective of an agent is summarized
as below:
• The agent prefers to a cheaper ticket and agrees to that the
cheaper the better.
• The agent prefers to travel at the weekend rather than at
working day.
• The agent prefers to no stop travel.
• The agent prefers to aisle seat then window seat.
• The agent prefers to travel during off-peak season rather than
peak season.
• The agent thinks the flight price is the most important fac-
tor, secondly the travel season, and other factors are of same
importance.
3) Based on the client’s perspective, the agent evaluates a flight
ticket using several terms (such as “very bad”, “bad”, “slightly
bad”, “acceptable”, “fairly good”, “good”, “very good”, etc.).
Using this scenario, an agent is required to bid for a flight ticket
based on the its attitude.
3.2 FAA-Bid Overview
In an automated auction, an agent’s bidding activity is influenced
mainly by two aspects, namely, 1) the attributes of goods and 2) the
agent’s attitude. Any agent prefers to make a bid for a quality goods
by adopting an appropriate bidding strategy. Considering the exis-
tence of uncertainty in a real auction situation, this paper focuses
on how to make bid by using the agent’s personal perspective.
To make a bid for a unit of goods, the agent should balance be-
tween his/her assessment on the goods and his/her attitude to win
an auction. Generally speaking, an agent has stronger attitude to
make bid for a quality goods rather than a lower one. The atti-
tude is mainly based on the assessment on the goods. Moreover,
an agent’s attitude is also influenced by the bids because price is
the unique factor through which agents negotiate till make a deal.
To win an auction, an agent must balance among the price (bid),
assessment on the goods and attitude to win a bid.
Roughly speaking, the bidding procedure runs as follows:
• Firstly, evaluation on each related attributes is determined.
• Then these evaluations are aggregated to form an overall as-
sessment on the goods.
• Next, the attitude of the agent is determined.
• Overall assessment is conducted.
• Finally, a new bid is determined.
Since in real situation uncertainty exists ubiquitously in express-
ing assessments, attitude as well as their relationships with price,
this paper uses fuzzy-set-based method to process uncertainty in
assessment and attitude. First of all, this paper uses a satisfac-
tory degree measure as the common universe of assessment, i.e.,
an assessment is treated as a fuzzy set on the satisfactory degree.
Secondly, an attitude is expressed as a fuzzy set on the set of as-
sessments, i.e., the assessment set is the universe of attitude.
In the following sections, details of the strategy is illustrated.
3.3 Attribute Evaluation
Attribute evaluation includes two kinds of process. The first one
is individual attribute assessment, and the second one is assess-
ment aggregation. To implement attribute evaluation, three issues
are concerned, i.e., attribute weights (relative importance) determi-
nation, assessment expression, and assessment aggregation.
3.3.1 Weights Determination
Weights indicate different preference of an agent on each iden-
tified factor. In this paper, we use the Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP) method [22] to determine the weight for each factor because
the AHP method is proved validate in practice although it may in-
duce inner inconsistency. Suppose the obtained initial weight vec-
tor is W .
3.3.2 Assessment Expression
Since uncertain expressions are often used in a real situation, this
paper uses linguistic terms to express assessments [11, 23]. These
linguistic terms are illustrated by fuzzy set. Moreover, the universe
of these fuzzy set are unified to real interval [0, 1] which means the
satisfactory degree of the agent to a particular attribute. Therefore,
all fuzzy sets have same universe which is convenient for aggregat-
ing assessments.
Suppose gk (k = 0, 1, . . . , K) is the satisfactory degree measure
for attribute ck. Then an agent’s opinion on the goods in terms of
attribute ck is denoted by gk(u) where u(∈ Uk) is the real attribute
value of attribute ck and Uk is the real universe for attribute ck.
For instance, departing time is an attribute for a flight ticket. The
possible departing time in a day is from 0 : 00 to 23 : 59. For
any time slot u, an agent may present a satisfactory degree such as
departing at 7 : 30 is with satisfactory degree 0.9 and departing at
3 : 00 is with 0.3.
In the following, let A = {a1, . . . , an} be the set of used as-
sessment terms which are fuzzy sets on satisfactory degree [0, 1].
Then a numeric satisfactory degree is transformed to a linguistic
term. Continue the above example, suppose the assessment set is
as shown in Figure 2. Notice that a7 is with the biggest the mem-
bership degree for 0.9, the assessment for departing at 7 : 30 is
a6 by the maximum membership degree principle. Similarly, the
assessment for 0.3 is a2.
3.3.3 Assessments Aggregation
An aggregated assessment is the agent’s overall opinion/preference
on the goods in terms of multiple attributes. The change of an at-
tribute value may leads to the alternation of an assessment. Instinct
natures of different attributes increase the difficulty and uncertainty
for obtaining an overall assessment. Notice that an agent’s prefer-
ence on an individual attribute can be expressed through the agent’s
satisfactory degree on that attribute. This paper uses an satisfactory
degree measure as the common universe of assessment.
Based on assessment on each individual attribute, an overall as-
sessment can be obtained as follows. Suppose the individual as-
sessments of all attributes are v0, v1, . . ., vK and the weights of
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Figure 2: Assessment aggregation
them are w0, w1, . . ., wk respectively. Then an overall assessment
is obtained by
a = Agg{(v0, w0), (v1, w1), . . . , (vK , wK)} (1)
where Agg is a selected aggregation method, vk ∈ A (k = 0, 1, . . . , K)
is the linguistic assessment on attribute ck.
To get an overall assessment in terms of a set of criteria, an ag-
gregation method Agg is applied. Some existing methods can be
used here, such as OWA operator [24, 25], 2-tuples linguistic ag-
gregation [5, 6, 11], and Weighted-sum. For convenience, we use
the weighted-sum-based method to obtain an overall assessment as
follows.




wk · vk(u), u ∈ [0, 1], (2)
where vk(u) is the membership degree of u in vk .




|ãλ − aiλ|dλ. (3)
Finally, we select the nearest term(s) a to ã as the overall assess-
ment.
For example, A has seven terms, namely, a1, a2, · · · , a7 as
shown in Fig. 2. Suppose ã is the obtained fuzzy set. By com-
paring the distances between ã and each element in A, we know
a6 is the nearest item to ã. Hence, a6 will be taken as the overall
assessment.
3.4 Attitude Estimation
Attitude is a learned predisposition to respond in a consistently
favorable or unfavorable manner with respect to a given object [8].
In other words, the attitude is a preparation in advance of the ac-
tual response, constitutes an important determinant of the ensuing
behavior. In AI, the fundamental notions to generate the desirable
behaviors of the agents often include goals, beliefs, intentions, and
commitments. Goal is a subset of states, and belief is a proposition
that is held as true by an agent. Bratman [2] addresses the prob-
lem of defining the nature of intentions. Crucial to his argument
is the subtle distinction between doing something intentionally and
intending to do something. Cohen and Levesque [4], on the other
hand, developed a logic in which intention is defined as a commit-
ment to act in a certain mental state of believing throughout what
he is doing. Thus to provide a definition of attitude that is concrete
enough for computational purposes, we model attitude using goals,
beliefs, intentions and commitments. From the Fishbein’s [8] def-
inition it is clear that when an attitude is adopted, an agent has to
exhibit an appropriate behavior (predisposition means behave in a
particular way). The exhibited behavior is based on a number of
factors which depends on the nature of the dynamic world. Once
an agent chose to adopt an attitude, it strives to maintain this at-
titude, until it reaches a situation where the agent may choose to
drop its current attitude towards the object and adopt a new atti-
tude towards the same object. Thus, an agent’s attitude towards an
object refers its persistent degree of commitment towards achiev-
ing one or several goals associated with the object, which give rise
to an overall favorable or unfavorable behavior with regard to that
object.
After conducting new assessment on the goods according to cur-
rent price pc, estimation of agent’s attitude is implemented. In or-
der to do so, the relationship between attitude and assessments is
required. In general, the better the assessment on the given goods
is, the stronger the attitude of bidding for that goods will be. How-
ever, this is by no means the unique relationship between attitude
and assessment. For instance, other agents’ competitive bidding
sometimes can also cause strong willingness.
Suppose E = {e1, . . . , em} is the set of attitude expressions,
A = {a1, . . . , an} is the set of assessments. Let
r : (ai ⇒ ej , αij), (4)
be a given rule from an agent where ai ∈ A, ej ∈ E, and αij
is the reliability degree of the rule. Such rule depicts the approxi-
mate degree of an agent’s attitude ej to which the agent can win the
bid under the assumption that the overall assessment is ai. Further-
more, these rules can be treated as a set of fuzzy sets on A such that
the membership degree in a fuzzy set fj corresponding to eagerness
ej is αij . Obviously, fj is an integration of rules (ai ⇒ ej , αij)
(i = 1, . . . , n), which is able to be treated as an alias of ej . Hence,
the fuzzy set fj is also called attitude in the following without other
specification.
Based on the rules in R, an agent can estimate the possible atti-
tude of the agent when it learns the current overall assessment. A
set of fuzzy sets is obtained through the following way: suppose
the overall assessment is ac, then the attitude at the moment is de-
termined by the maximum membership degree principle
ec ∈ E(ac) = {ej ∈ E|fj(ac)  fi(ac) if i = j}. (5)
Notice that such determined ec may not necessarily be unique. In
the following, we call E(ac) the candidate attitude set under ac.
Once the current attitude of the agent is determine, requirements
for search new bids can then be determined. The main require-
ments include identifying required overall assessment and finding
the candidate prices.
3.5 Overall Assessment
Prerequisite of overall assessment is the basic requirement on
the goods such that the agent has the highest possibility to win a
bid under the current attitude. To find the prerequisite of overall
assessment, an order is firstly defined in E according to the strength
of attitude. Without loss of generality, suppose ei < ej if i < j.
Therefore, it is possible to select the strongest element from E(ac).
Then the strongest element in E(ac) is chosen as the first candidate
attitude to determine the prerequisite of overall assessment.
Suppose a set of rules R̄ is determined such that any r̄ ∈ R̄ is of
form
r̄ : (ej ⇒ ai, ᾱij), (6)
where ej ∈ E, ai ∈ A, and ᾱij is the reliability degree. These
rules indicate to what extend an assessment ai is obtained given an
attitude ej .
Based on the maximum membership degree principle, a set of
candidate assessment is determined such that
A(ec) = {ai ∈ A|f̄i(ec)  f̄j(ec) if i = j}, (7)
where f̄i is the counterpart to fi. Each element a in A(ec) is called
a candidate assessment under eagerness ec.
3.6 Agent Price Determination
An agent’s assessment demonstrates some expectation on the
quality of the goods. As other criteria except the price are seldom
changeable in an auction, this is regarded in terms of price.
Suppose U0 = [pl, pu] is the real range of price. A price range
U(a) corresponding to a candidate assessment a is a subset of U0
such that for any u ∈ U(a), the assessment based on u and W
is a. Notice that an assessment is a fuzzy set on the satisfactory
degree [0, 1] which is the bridge between assessment and price, a
price range is determined by the following steps.
Step 1: We divide the satisfactory degree [0, 1] into n subsets
D1, D2, . . ., Dn such that
ai(d)  aj(d) (8)
for any d ∈ Di and j = i, i.e., element in Di with biggest mem-
bership degree in ai.
Step 2: For Da corresponding to a candidate assessment a, we
select price in U0 such that ga(u) ∈ Da. Ua is called a candi-
date bid set. Concerning that the satisfactory degree is continu-
ously change with the price, we assume that Ua is an interval in
U0. Hence, let pla and pua be the left and right boundary of Ua.
Thus, a candidate price range for assessment a is determined.
For instance, Fig. 3 indicates that the price range corresponding to



















Figure 3: Candidate price range.
Suppose for any element in A(ec), we have obtained a corre-
sponding candidate price range. Because new bid should higher
than the present price pc, a candidate price set for A(ec) is deter-
mined by
UA = {pli|pli > pc, ai ∈ A(ec)}
∪ {pui|pui > pc, ai ∈ A(ec)}.
As it can be seen that the candidate price range may not exist
under some assessments, in these case, a weaker attitude is selected
to repeat the candidate price determination process until a range is
found or the attitude is weaker than an acceptable level.
Suppose UA is a found price range, there must be a smallest ele-
ment b in it. Then b is selected as the new bid. For example, in Fig.
3, suppose the current flight price is $900, the prerequisite assess-
ment is a6, and the least increment is $50, then the new should be
$950.
4. EXPERIMENT EVALUATION
In this section, an experiment implements the fuzzy bidding strat-
egy in a scenario in which an agent intends to book flight tickets.
Six factors (as shown in Table 1) are concerned in this situation, i.e.
ticket price (c0), depart time (c1), arrival time (c2), number of stops
(c3), seat positions (c4), and travel season (c5). The flight ticket bid
for is a return ticket to destination D with the following properties:
- price: $800 – $2000;
- depart time: 18:00 PM, Wednesday;
- return arrival time: 10:00 AM, Friday;
- number of stops: 1;
- seat position: window;
- travel season: April (off-peak season).
Table 1: Concerned attributes of a flight ticket.
Attributes Symb. Values range Weights
price c0 $[800–2000] 0.4
depart time c1 Sun. 0:00 – Sat. 24:00 0.1
arrival time c2 Sun. 0:00 – Sat. 24:00 0.1
stops c3 0, 1, 2, 3 0.1
seat position c4 window, aisle, middle 0.1
flight season c5 Jan. 01 – Dec. 31 0.2
Suppose the identified perspective of an agent is summarized as
below:
• The agent prefers to a cheaper ticket and agrees to that the
cheaper the better.
• The agent prefers to travel at the weekend rather than at
working day.
• The agent prefers to no stop travel.
• The agent prefers to aisle seat then window seat.
• The agent prefers to travel during off-peak season rather than
peak season.
• The agent thinks the flight price is the most important fac-
tor, secondly the travel season, and other factors are of same
importance.
Based on the agent’s perspective, the agent evaluates the ticket us-
ing seven terms (shown in Figure 4), i.e., very bad (a1), bad (a2),
slightly bad (a3), acceptable (a4), fairly good (a5), good (a6), and
very good (a7). The seven terms are expressed by fuzzy sets on the
satisfactory degree [0, 1] as below (see Figure 4):
fai = e
−162(x−(i−1) 16 )2 , i = 1, . . . , 7. (9)
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Figure 4: Assessment terms.
As the ticket price is the changeable factor, the assessment on it
is determined dynamically. For convenience, suppose the agent’s






Now assume the current price (pc) is $900, the agent is required
to determine a new bid in this situation.
First, the satisfactory degree of the current price is calculated by
Eq. (10), which is 0.91. Because fa7(0.91) = 0.35 and fa6(0.92) =















Figure 5: Overall assessment.
Next, since the price changes will affect the weights of all fac-
tors, a new overall assessment of the ticket is calculated. Suppose
the increase of price weight is 0.05, i.e., the current weight of price
is w′0 = 0.45. Then the weights of other factors are calculated by









Therefore, a fuzzy set ã(u) is obtained (ã(u) in Figure 5). Then by
Eq. (3), the most nearest assessment to ã is a6. So the new overall
assessment for the ticket is a6.
Table 2: Rule set for attitude estimation.
attitude
ass. e1 e2 e3 e4 e5
a1 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.27 0.13
a2 0.10 0.28 0.22 0.26 0.13
a3 0.10 0.26 0.18 0.32 0.13
a4 0.17 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.12
a5 0.12 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.16
a6 0.12 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.13
a7 0.12 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.10
Then the agent needs to estimate the agent’s attitude according
to this assessment. Suppose the agent uses five terms to distinguish
the attitude, i.e., none (e1), slightly (e2), medium(e3), strong (e4),
and very strong (e5). In order to estimate the agent’s attitude, a
set of rules of form Eq. (4) are extracted from a historical auction















Figure 6: Illustration for rule set R.
Table 3: Rule set for prerequisite of assessment identification.
assessment
att. a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
e1 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.06
e2 0.07 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.06
e3 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.09
e4 0.09 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.06
e5 0.08 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.05
By Figure 6, the agent’s attitudes at this moment are e2 and e3
because they have the highest reliability. Because e3 is stronger
than e2, the agent first searches possible bids under the attitude
e3. Based on e3, the agent discovers that a6 is the most preferred
assessment on the ticket through rules in Table 3. Hence, it will
determine a candidate price range based on the assessment a6.
Based on Figure 4, the agent can divide the satisfactory degree
interval [0, 1] into seven sub-intervals. In this figure, the interval
corresponding to assessment a6 is $[900–1100] and the current
price pc belongs to this interval. Hence, a new bid can be selected
from the interval. According to the FAB-strategy, the smallest one
greater than the pc(900) will be selected. For instance, if the least
increase is $50, then the new bid b is $950.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a novel fuzzy bidding strategy (FAA-Bid) is dis-
cussed. It was noticed that agents, which adopt attitudes, behave
more flexibly and efficiently than agents without attitude and adapt
more easily to dynamic situations. Another unique idea presented
in this paper is that to deal quantitatively the imprecision or uncer-
tainty of multiple attributes of items to acquire in auctions, fuzzy set
technique is used. The fuzzy logic provides attitude based agents
provide resources in the decision making process of bidding agent.
The bidding strategy also allows for flexible heuristics both for the
overall gain and for individual attribute evaluations. It also explores
the relationships between evaluations of different attributes using
Analytic Hierarchy Process method [22].
There are a number of areas of further investigation. In future
we would further like to explore the development of strategies for
multiple auctions. We would also like to compare our bidding
techniques with other decision theoretic approaches to determine
the relative strengths and weaknesses of these methods. Different
strategies may perform well in some environments but may perform
poorly in another. The numbers of strategies that can be employed
are endless and the search space is huge. To address this issue,
we intend to use learning techniques to obtain a model of the price
dynamics based on the past data and to search for most successful
strategies in predefined environments in an offline fashion.
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